SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION

Marc Williams


 


Introduction
The end of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations resulted in the creation of a new international trade organisation. From the outset the increased scope of the WTO as the institutional nexus of the multilateral trading system attracted criticism from social movement representatives. The aim of this paper is to explore social movement activism directed at the WTO. Political contestation over the activities of the WTO has to be understood in the context of an evolving global political economy. Within the international political economy globalisation has generated conflict among state and non-state actors, and instigated a search for regulatory frameworks to lessen the impact of globalising processes. This process of internationalising national economies creates a search for new forms of transnational governance and regulation. Central to this process has been the rise of social movements linking civil society across national boundaries and thus actively shaping and re-shaping international politics. Social movements critique constitutive practices of the international system and in particular expose their potential for offering alternatives and for instigating far reaching social change. Recent research on social movements and world politics has shown that these movements are increasingly organised and impact the decisions of states, firms and inter-governmental organisations. The global political space for organising and engaging in critical dialogues about issues of transnational concern has been expanded due to a changed political environment. And the strengthening of the international trade regime has provided the political space in which environmental activists have sought to challenge the liberal ideology of the hegemonic discourse on trade policy.

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) has emerged as one of the key structures of global governance in the international political economy. As a successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) the WTO widens and deepens global regulation of international trade and payments. It extends GATT disciplines into areas previously governed by protectionist devices in the post-war global trade regime, i.e. agriculture, and textiles, and �new� issues such as intellectual property rights and in addition subjects investment measures to regulatory control. The WTO�s mandate has brought it into conflict with a range of social movement activists representing consumer, development, labour, and environmental interests. If the relatively weak GATT had attracted criticism the more powerful WTO was destined to incur the suspicion of a number of groups marginal to the decision-making processes on international trade issues in their home countries.

The argument will proceed in three main stages. First, I will sketch the WTO as an international organisation. I will try to assess the extent to which the creation of the WTO transformed the world trade regime. In so far as the WTO represents an increase in regulatory powers, and greater surveillance over national trade policies it is likely to provide a site of contestation for competing groups and perspectives. Second, the paper will address the criticisms made of the WTO by social movement activists. In this section I will principally be concerned with those social movement actors engaged in trying to influence the WTO through engagement strategies rather than with those groups that adopt a rejectionist stance. More attention will be given to demands for procedural reform rather than the substantive issues with which a number of social movements e.g. environmental and labour have been concerned. In the third section I will attempt to examine the impact of social movement activity on the WTO.
 

The WTO and Global Governance
In this section I will situate the WTO within the international trade regime. First, the organisational characteristics of the organisation will be presented. The aim here is to demonstrate the scope and domain of the organisation. In this context scope refers to the number of policy sectors on which decisions are taken and the significance of these policy sectors for national and transnational actors. Domain of the organisation refers to the impact of the organisation's policy on other actors. The domain of an organisation will vary depending on its capacity to affect the decision-making ability of other actors. Second, this section will examine the mobilisation of bias inherent in the WTO's framework. In other words, the extent to which the values embedded within the WTO support certain discursive practices and marginalise particular values and orientations.

The WTO was established on 1 January 1995 as a result of the decisions taken by the Contracting Parties to the GATT at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. The Final Act signed in Marrakesh in April 1994 concluded a process began at Punta del Este, Uruguay in September 1986. The WTO as the successor to the GATT provides the legal and institutional foundation of the global trading system. It replicates but also extends the mandate of the GATT. As an organisation the WTO has three main dimensions. It is, first, a legal agreement which provides a framework of rules, norms and principles to govern the multilateral trading system. In other words, it is the legal and institutional foundation of the world trading system. Second, it is a forum for multilateral trade negotiations. Multilateral trade agreements specify the principal contractual obligations determining trade negotiations and trade legislation, and the Trade Policy Mechanism facilitates the evolution of trade relations and trade policy. And, third, it acts as a centre for the settlement of disputes. The WTO dispute settlement procedures provide the machinery for settling members' differences on their rights and obligations. The extension of the WTO beyond trade in goods into intellectual property protection, surveillance over investment issues, and the strengthening of the dispute settlement procedures opens up a wider debate concerning the role of a multilateral trade organisation. Moreover, whereas the GATT as a contractual agreement appeared a blunt international organisation, the WTO can be conceived as a sharp organisation.

The scope and complexity of the WTO is evident from a consideration of its key institutional features. The organisation consists of the following institutional features:

the Agreement establishing the WTO;

- GATT 1994 and other multilateral trade agreements for goods including Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), the agreement on technical barriers to trade (TBT), and the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs);

- the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS);

- the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property measures (TRIPs);

- the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes;

- the Trade Policies Monitoring Mechanism (TPRM);

- and Plurilateral Agreements governing civil aircraft; government procurement; and dairy and bovine meat (the acceptance of these agreements is not mandatory for WTO members).

The chief decision-making body is the Ministerial Conference which meets every two years. To date three Ministerial Conferences have been held (Singapore, December 1996, Geneva, May 1998, and Seattle, November-December 1999). In the intervals between the convening of Ministerial Conferences a General Council which also acts as the dispute settlement body and the trade policies review body, together with a number of committees oversees the day-to-day work of the organisation. The WTO is serviced by a Secretariat based in Geneva.

The WTO like its predecessor is founded on liberal principles. The theory of comparative advantage (or factor endowments) at the heart of modern trade theory is firmly enshrined within liberal economic thought. Even when contemporary economists critically address the unrealistic nature of the central assumptions of modern trade theory they nevertheless conclude that free trade remains the bedrock of neo-classical economics. In this perspective free trade is superior to no trade because the gains from trade outweigh the disadvantages. A liberal trading regime is beneficial because it will promote increased consumption, and provide opportunities to export surplus production. Contrary to liberal theory mercantilist thought stresses power relations in the global economy. Mercantilist writers highlight the gap between the theory of free trade and the reality of international specialisation. They assert the primacy of sectional interests and the dominance of protectionist impulses in the framing of national economic policies. Furthermore, mercantilist writers argue that free trade tends to support the interests of the economically powerful at the expense of the weak. Moreover, the WTO is based on an economistic approach to social issues. Within this model the economic benefits of trade liberalisation are given priority over non-economic costs.

Multilateralism has historically been opposed by bilateralism and regionalism. The WTO as a site of multilateral trade negotiations and instrument to enforce judicial decision is committed to maintaining an open and multilateral system. In this respect universalism is preferred to regionalism. Multilateral trade agreements specify the principal contractual obligations determining trade negotiations and trade legislation, and the Trade Policy Mechanism facilitates the evolution of trade relations and trade policy. Globalisation has been accompanied by a growing discourse of multilateralism. The end of the Cold War and increasing liberalisation in national economies gave rise to hopes that the embedded liberalism of the post-war period could finally emerge into a fully fledged liberal order. The extension of the WTO beyond trade in goods into intellectual property protection, surveillance over investment issues, and the strengthening of the dispute settlement procedures opens up a wider debate concerning the role of a multilateral trade organisation.

As I have argued elsewhere, "The trade regime as constructed in the GATT is a mixture of bilateralism and multilateralism. The GATT rules strike a compromise between global economic integration, multilateralism, and a reliance on market forces on the one hand, and the quest for domestic stability, economic expediency and bilateralism on the other." In assessing the WTO the crucial question to be confronted is whether the movement from the GATT to the WTO has transformed the historic compromise between national and global forces. Many social movement activists argue that it has and contend that the resolution has been in favour of global forces.

It is generally accepted that the multilateral trading system instituted at the end of the Second World War was based on four key principles viz. non-discrimination, reciprocity, transparency and multilateral co-operation. From 1947 until the end of 1995 the GATT was the institutional expression of this rule based system. The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations which led to the creation of the WTO accepted the four pillars of the trading regime but also transformed the management of world trade in three respects. First, it engineered a shift from trade liberalisation based on tariff concessions (shallow or negative integration) to discussions of domestic policies, institutional practices and regulations (deep or positive integration). Second, it constructed a new agenda expanding the scope (through the inclusion of services, trade related intellectual property rights, and domestic [non-trade] policies), and changing the character of negotiations from a focus on bargaining over products to negotiations over policies that shape the conditions of competition. A third innovation was a movement towards policy harmonisation e.g., in the areas of subsidies, trade related investment measures, and services. This transformation of the institutional basis of the world trading system from the negative integration practised under GATT to the positive integration envisaged in the WTO is illustrative of the impact of globalisation on world trade. Globalisation has been accompanied by a growing discourse of multilateralism. The end of the Cold War and increasing liberalisation in national economies gave rise to hopes that the embedded liberalism of the post-war period could finally emerge into a fully fledged liberal order. Trade liberalisation under GATT consisted essentially of tariff cutting exercises. In this sense it can be seen as a negative process of restricting barriers to trade. In this process dispute settlement procedures were weak, and the power of the organisation to discipline errant members severely limited. The WTO not only extends the mandate of the GATT into new areas it redefines the relationship between national governments and the world trading system through the creation of an effective dispute settlement mechanism, the provision of a trade policy review mechanism, and the development of a set of mandatory codes. The WTO thus provides a higher and sharper profile for trade issues, and as such attracts the attention of a range of actors. Compared with the GATT, the increased scope, permanence and rule-making authority of the WTO has alarmed a number of social movement activists who fear that the organisation and control of vital national decisions have been gradually and irretrievably displaced from national control to a supranational organisation shrouded in secrecy. It is within this context of the expanded scope and domain of the WTO that social movement interest in, and engagement with the organisation has to be placed. In the next section I examine the relationship between social movements and the WTO. In essence I will be concerned with the political space which constrains or fosters interaction between social movements, and the WTO, and the campaign by social movement activists for expanded participation by civil society actors within the organisational framework of the WTO.
 

Contra the WTO: The Social Movement Critique
Critics of the WTO allege that the organisation lacks transparency, accountability, and fails to provide participation for a wide range of stakeholders affected by its decisions. They contend that the WTO plays an important role in legitimising a specific solution to trade and environment issues. Given the function of the WTO as an instrument of legitimacy in the evolving structures of global governance it is thus imperative that the organisation is fully representative of a diverse set of interests. These critics reject the exclusively intergovernmental character of the WTO arguing that the organisation should not be conceived solely in such restrictive terms. In this sense, the events in Seattle merely brought to increased prominence the inescapable fact, if this was not apparent previously, that the authority of the WTO is linked with civil society groups. This conclusion implies no positive endorsement of the tactics of some demonstrators in Seattle, nor does it imply that national governments accepted the claims of the protesters. Rather it recognises the political importance of this wider constituency in future trade talks.

Critics of the intergovernmental character of the WTO claim that emerging global structures of governance to be legitimate should provide for representation from civil society. Representatives from these groups have a role to play in making the world trading system more transparent and accountable. The decisions of the WTO it is claimed impact on the lives of millions across the globe and the promotion of sustainable development requires global democracy. The WTO should be accountable not solely to its member states but to diverse communities around the world directly affected by trade liberalisation. There are two interrelated aspects to this critique of the WTO. The first or negative part concerns the absence of transparency and accountability, and the second or positive part is related to the reasons why greater participation by specifically NGOs, and increased transparency will enhance democracy in the WTO.

The WTO it is claimed is a secretive organisation lacking in transparency and accountability. Transparency is lacking in two respects. First, negotiations are conducted, dispute panels are convened and decisions are taken solely in the presence of member states. Civil society groups are thus effectively disbarred from providing a valuable watchdog function for the wider public. Second, although the WTO has moved toward the derestriction of most of its documents and has constructed a web site which provides access to a wide range of its published output critics nevertheless contend that the provision whereby crucial documents can be kept restricted until six months after being issued severely restricts the monitoring functions of NGOs. An organisation lacking in transparency, and with a restricted membership it is argued cannot effectively be accountable to its constituents. Indeed, some allege that the WTO pursues a free trade agenda responsible for creating environmental degradation, increasing global poverty, supporting human rights abuses and undermining the power of democratic scrutiny of trade policies. This increase in global decision-making privileges the interests of transnational corporations and enhances their power at the expense of local communities. If the WTO is accountable to any constituency it is to that of global capital. In short, the WTO as a structure of global governance is not subject to democratic accountability.

It follows from the above that increased participation by civil society groups in the WTO�s institutional structure would automatically improve the representativeness and responsiveness of the organisation. The case for increased participation by such groups, however, does not rest solely, on the negative case presented above. Three broad claims have been made for the increased participation of civil society groups in the WTO. First, it is argued opening up WTO bodies to NGOs will enhance the output of the WTO through providing a balanced policy input. Environmental NGOs have argued that the more extensive the number of views in the decision-making process the better the policy outcomes. Administrative structures that integrate public input will consistently produce better results than those where information input is restricted. In relation to the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) critics argue that NGOs� presence at formal CTE meetings would be a recognition of the public interest existing in this area and would help to make the WTO�s work more broadly available to the public. Proceedings that are not transparent perpetuate a secretive image of the organisation and diminishes public confidence and support for the WTO�s work. This leads to misunderstanding and suspicion of the deliberative process of the trading system. Secondly, NGOs possess specialised knowledge and can therefore make a constructive contribution to the trade-environment debate. Increased participation of environmental NGOs will ensure that a full range of potential consequences are addressed because they can provide information and technical expertise, not necessarily available in inter-governmental deliberations, on environmental matters. Third, enhanced participation by NGOs will increase public support for the WTO. Governments rely on public support for implementing trade policies and therefore an educated public will understand the complexities of policy-making and more readily provide support for increased trade liberalisation. Social movement participation enhances credibility, and broad based support fostered by public participation ensures that policies are likely to be implemented. Moreover, wider public participation counters the role of vested interests and therefore ensures that policies are taken in the public interest. Wary of the argument that commercial secrecy dictates the intergovernmental nature of trade negotiations NGO supporters insist that increased participation need not jeopardise secrecy considerations.

Defenders of the status quo reject the claim that WTO decision-making is undemocratic, secretive and therefore the organisation lacks legitimacy. A number of different, if related, issues are at stake and it is important to carefully distinguish the various strands to the engagement between proponents and opponents of the status quo. One issue concerns the extent to which the members of the WTO fully reflect the interests of their domestic societies. The legal framework of international relations either assumes the irrelevance of the domestic constituency or congruity between governmental representatives and their populations. In a strict legal positivist approach the state is the true subject of international law and in assuming membership of an international organisation de facto represents the interests of its constituents. In this perspective it makes little sense to ask whether the state truly represents its citizens. To put this another way, the state acts in terms of the national interest where the derivation of the national interest is not subject to debate. A more liberal interpretation with an emphasis on popular sovereignty would be concerned with the democratic credentials of the state. In this version the state�s legitimacy (and hence that of the WTO) depends on the extent to which the government of the state has been democratically elected. Both perspectives are evident in the debate on the democratic credentials of the WTO. Supporters of the existing WTO framework argue that the WTO�s legitimacy is derived from the support of its member states. In other words, the WTO was created by states and depends for its continued functioning on the support of its state members. Moreover, given that trade policy is the result of a domestic political bargain it is at the national level that interest groups should attempt to influence policy. The primary responsibility for taking account of different elements of the public interest which are brought to bear on trade policy making and hence relations with NGOs resides at the national level. Arrangements in the WTO cannot substitute for these domestic fora. Access for NGOs in the CTE, for example, may complicate the consultative process with NGOs at the national level. In addition it is claimed that the high levels of secrecy essential for trade negotiations can only be maintained if the state-centric nature of the organisation remains in its current form. Multilateral trade negotiations require governments to forge compromises between various domestic interests, a strategy that would become increasingly complicated if non-state actors were given a greater degree of representation within the formal organisational framework. Thus the various groups attempting to lobby the WTO should do so in their home countries.

This portrait of democratic pluralism has been challenged by civil society activists who contend that trade policy remains the preserve of the elite. The WWF calls for governments to be made more accountable to their populace. It argues that WTO policies should be scrutinised through extensive parliamentary procedures and consultations at the domestic level with stakeholders. The International Institute for Sustainable Development extends this critique arguing that it is "wrong to focus all attention at the WTO. Key problems lies at the national level�in the opaque processes that too often characterise trade policy development." Thus there is a need to improve transparency and accountability at the domestic level.

A second issue relates to the policies pursued by the WTO. Supporters of the current arrangements argue that any the admission of non-state actors into the negotiating process is likely to increase protectionist sentiment in the organisation since social movement representatives and many firms do not support the goal of trade liberalisation. The world trading system needs to be strengthened so that the forces of protectionism do not triumph over those of free trade. The WTO represents a complex bargain and set of codes whereby states commit to progressively freeing trade. They do this through accepting international obligations and rejecting the demands of protectionist elements in the domestic arena. Any attempt to widen the membership will result in giving further justification to protectionist elements. In other words, WTO deliberations will be compromised if public interest groups were allowed to participate directly in its work programme.

Furthermore, defenders of the current institutional structure query the representative nature of NGOs. They argue that not only will it be difficult to devise a method of accrediting legitimate NGOs but that many NGOs do not represent a distinct community of interests. Thus a practical difficulty arises when extending participation to NGOs since it is not clear whom to invite for example. And, many governments from the developing world have expressed concern that any increase in the role given to NGOs will further strengthen Northern interests in the organisation since those NGOs possessing the expertise and financial resources to engage directly with the WTO are likely to be based in the North.

In addition to the general debate concerning the representative and accountable nature of the WTO a further aspect of the legitimate authority of the WTO is raised in relation to the environment classified as one of the �new issues� in the world trading system. Between 1947 and the onset of the Tokyo Round in 1973 the GATT presided over trade in visible goods. From the Tokyo Round onwards, the trade agenda has expanded to include investment, intellectual property rights, labour issues, competition policy, and environment. The extension of the agenda provides sites of contestation between conflicting interests. One of the many areas in contention concerns the extent to which so-called new issues should be included in multilateral trade negotiations. In contradistinction many developing countries object to the inclusion of environmental issues in the WTO. The environment remains a political issue between developed and developing countries with the latter sceptical concerning the inclusion of environmental issues in the multilateral trade system. From the perspective of developing countries the insertion of environment issues and labour standards on the agenda represents an attempt by Northern states to discriminate against their exports. Within the framework of WTO negotiations the trade-environment debate and labour standards are linked in their analyses as issues that they think will be harmful to their developmental prospects. In contradistinction some environmentalists, for example, argue that the WTO is an inappropriate forum in which to discuss the trade-environment debate since the organisation is committed to trade liberalisation and its constitution notwithstanding cannot adequately incorporate sustainable development into its practices. These groups would like to see a closer connection between trade and the environment but query the legitimacy of the WTO since they perceive it to be biased in favour of free trade. And trade union activists and human rights advocates similarly reject free trade as the basis of the liberal trading system since they insist that workers and children�s rights must be given precedence over economic growth. Many social movement representatives contend that the absence of labour standards benefit corporations and do not contribute to poverty alleviation.
 

Impact
The argument to date has outlined competing perspectives on the transparency, representative nature and accountability of the WTO. It now remains to show the significance of these developments. In what ways are the criticisms of the WTO politically significant? And, if they are to what extent have they undermined the legitimacy of the organisation? How important is the issue of legitimacy to the furtherance of the globalisation project?

The failure of the Seattle Ministerial Meeting to launch a new round of trade talks led many observers to proclaim that the world trading system is in crisis. Perception of a world trading system in crisis is not novel and it is perhaps the prevalence of crisis as much as the faith in its achievements that spurred the lavish celebrations in 1998 to mark fifty years of the multilateral trading system. Some thirteen months after the impasse at the Seattle conference the WTO remains unable to revive its agenda. Future negotiations remains suspended until a new impetus can be given to the stalled trade talks. A crucial aspect of the current malaise of the organisation arises from continued questioning of its legitimacy, and scrutiny of its decision-making procedures. The WTO has been the target of environmentalists, human rights activists, trade unionists, and supporters of international development among others. These critics have persistently challenged the liberalisation project at the heart of the WTO, and its institutional arrangements. They have pursued their critique through lobbying governments, the WTO itself, and the dissemination of information to journalists and the wider public. These separate (and at times explicitly linked) campaigns have not, on their own, created the current malaise in the multilateral trading system but their efforts especially their rejection of unfettered trade liberalisation and promotion of a reform agenda centred on making the WTO more transparent and accountable has contributed to the current situation.

It is widely accepted that further trade liberalisation rests on public acquiescence in the process. It is vital that citizens perceive that they have effective control over the international trade regime. As Gary Sampson has argued, "Improving understanding of the WTO is important to securing the necessary support for future trade negotiations from environmentalists and other civil society representatives." In the absence of such understanding the legitimacy of the rules and norms of the multilateral trading system will be called into question. It has come to be recognised in the trade community and by opponents of the WTO that public confidence is a necessary ingredient for trade reform. On one hand, governments are unlikely to create the necessary domestic coalitions required to support further trade liberalisation in the absence of a domestic consensus in favour of such change. On the other hand, violent protests against trade liberalisation in developed and developing countries, in the absence of an informed public debate, is likely to assist protectionist elements. Thus defenders of the liberal trade order and supporters of increased trade liberalisation need to ensure domestic and global constituencies in favour of the liberalisation project. Thus criticism of the WTO that focuses on its shortcomings as a democratic institution and cast doubt on the wisdom of its policies is politically significant. Although it is debatable whether contestation by social movement activists over WTO policies have undermined the legitimacy of the organisation the evidence suggests that the debates outlined above have raised doubts concerning the legitimacy of the WTO and world trading system. Social movements are significant in shaping the context within which the authority of the WTO is determined.

Moreover, it is apparent that the member states of the WTO have not dismissed these challenges but have instead responded to them in ways that suggest concern with the organisation�s credibility. Governments have been prepared to engage with representatives of civil society, and have opened access to the WTO in attempts to widen the public base of support for increased liberalisation. Although non-state actors remain formally excluded from participating in WTO deliberations the organisation in response to critiques concerning its democratic credentials has revised its earlier policy of exclusion. Two decisions taken in July 1996 have progressively provided expanded access to the organisation for social movement activists, and corporate actors. The WTO�s definition of a non-governmental organisation is inclusive of business groups. First, the Secretariat is involved in initiating consultations and dialogue with civil society organisations. This has resulted in direct contacts between the Director-General and NGOs, and symposia for NGOs to discuss trade, development and environment issues. Another example of this evolution can be seen in the facilities provided for NGOs at the Ministerial Meetings. Second, the WTO initiated a process to make its documents more readily available to the public. Most WTO documents are circulated as unrestricted, some are de-restricted automatically after a sixty day period, others can be de-restricted at the request of a member but others, especially those pertaining to important current policy decisions remain restricted.

This debate on the openness, and accountability of the WTO has been active from the inception of the organisation and remains an important one for supporters and opponents of the multilateral trading system. Major governments, especially the US have shown awareness of the necessity for wide public support of further trade liberalisation, and of the WTO. In the CTE and General Council the US has consistently supported increased access for NGOs and greater transparency. US support was crucial in the decisions to derestrict documents, and expand dialogue between the Secretarait and NGOs in 1996; at the May 1998 Ministerial Meeting Pesident Clinton called for increased participation of civil society groups in the WTO; and in Seattle the US position on labour and environmental issues clearly owed much to the perceived necessity of support by these groups in domestic US trade politics.
 

Conclusion
This paper has examined one aspect of the social movement critique of the WTO. It argued that institutional change in the world trading system has elicited a response from diverse elements in civil society Social movement actors are campaigning for a democratisation of the reflects interests beyond those narrowly conceived in the prevailing inter-state paradigm. Two competing perspectives are evident in this debate. Governmental representatives insist that arguments concerning the undemocratic nature of the WTO are misguided. The organisation is an intergovernmental one, and citizens� interests can be represented within the process of the making of international trade law through the political processes existing in member states. The WTO in this perspective is merely the sum of its members, and the question of democratic control should be placed at the national and not international level. Social movement activists (especially development and environmental groups) contend that activity at the national level fails to capture the complete nature of global governance and contemporary forms of regulation. Hence their is a need to democratise international institutions (in this case the WTO so that they reflect the interests of stakeholders in society marginalised or excluded by �normal� forms of international politics. It is evident that the influence of social movement activists in the United States convinced the Clinton administration to support claims for increased access for civil society representatives. At the Geneva Ministerial Meeting in May 1998 President Clinton�s proposed that �the WTO for the first time, provide(s) a forum where business, labour, environmental, and consumer groups can speak out and help guide the further evolution of the WTO� .

Moreover, a range of social movement actors are attempting to shift the dominant approach to international trade paradigm to ensure that environmental and social issues are inscribed in a meaningful manner in trade negotiations. These issues remain contentious but efforts by these representatives of the environmental movement to insert environmental issues into the world trading system have met with some success. The complacent approach of trade officials has been replaced by one in which the linkages between trade and the environment have been subject to detailed scrutiny. As the Seattle Ministearial Meeting demonstrated labour issues remain hotly contested.

The ability of social movement activists to challenge the system of world trade rules is constrained by the institutional context of the WTO and the discourse of free trade. The WTO is a relatively closed organisation to participation by social movement representatives. The tradition of secrecy in trade negotiations, the intergovernmental status of the organisation and its function as a negotiating forum militate against increased access for social movement activists.
 

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